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A new outlook on the CSDP
Since Estonia joined the EU in 2004, it has taken 
a series of CSDP initiatives with a pinch of salt, due 
to a fear that NATO would be duplicated, and that 
transatlantic ties crucial for the Baltic states would 
be undermined. Another concern was that the EU 
was placing too much stress on threats from the 
southern neighbourhood. Here, political and stra-
tegic considerations were coupled with practical 
problems. Being one of the smallest NATO and 
EU countries, Estonia does not have the financial, 
administrative, or military capacity to become fully 
involved in new cooperation formats if it is not 
confident that this will truly bolster the country’s 
security. This has led Estonia to strictly define its 
military cooperation priorities. It can be seen for 
example by Estonia’s engagement in foreign oper-
ations, in which it is concerned with making a val-
uable contribution rather than seeking a symbolic 
presence in the largest number of missions possi-
ble. The withdrawal of ships from the Baltic Naval 
Squadron (BALTRON) also signifies this approach.
Estonia’s new outlook on the CSDP has been 
caused above all by shifts in US foreign and secu-
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Over the last few years, Tallinn has been increasingly involved in military cooperation in the EU and 
with France. To date, Estonia is the only country on NATO’s eastern flank to join the French-led Euro-
pean Intervention Initiative. The country is developing the European pillar of its security policy with 
a view to diversifying military cooperation, which has centred primarily around the US and UK. This 
is due to Estonia’s concerns about the future of their military posture in Europe. However, due to the 
leading role of the US and UK in NATO’s deterrence and defence on the eastern flank, working with 
the two countries will continue to be Estonia’s security policy priority.
Apart from involvement in a number of PESCO projects, Estonia is focused on expanding its partici-
pation in the EU defence industrial cooperation. In June 2020, five Estonian-based entities  received 
over EUR 10 million from the European Defence Industrial Development Programme, making this 
small country the main Central and Eastern Europe recipient of the programme funds. Estonia is also 
increasing  its contribution to French military operations. In July 2020, roughly fifty Estonian special 
forces troops were sent to Mali to reinforce the French operation Takuba in the Sahel.
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rity policy that followed when Donald Trump took 
office. The lack of permanent US military presence 
on Estonian soil since 2017 – as part of the NATO 
enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) or bilaterally – 
was also a major factor (from 2014 until 2017, the 
US had a permanent rotation of a company-size 
unit in Estonia, as it did in Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Poland). Brexit and the following Franco-German 
military cooperation initiatives in the EU have also 
contributed to a change in Estonia’s approach 
towards the CSDP. Due to Brexit Estonia took over 
the UK’s presidency of the Council of the EU in the 
latter half of 2017, at a time when the most crucial 
decisions concerning further development of the 
CSDP were being made. Cooperation between 
France and Estonia during that presidency led to 
greater involvement of Estonian politicians and 
officials in plans to enhance EU military coopera-
tion, which were incorporated into the presidency 
programme. 
Estonia also decided to take an active part in 
initiatives such as permanent structured coop-
eration (PESCO) or the European Defence Fund. 
Developing the cooperation with European al-
lies allowed Estonia to partly diversify its firmly 
pro-Atlantic security policy. Despite this, the 
CSDP is paid relatively little attention in Estonian 
security policy debate, which focuses on NATO 
and transatlantic relations. The government and 
political parties comment sparingly on the CSDP, 
favouring the ‘NATO first’ principle, and em-
phasising the importance of EU cooperation in 
‘soft security’ matters such as terrorism, illegal 
immigration, border protection, and the role 
of NATO-EU cooperation. The Estonian view is 
fittingly summarised by the words of a former 
commander of Estonia’s armed forces, General 
Riho Terras, who sees development of the CSDP 
primarily as investments in new technology, im-
proved operational capability, and an opportunity 
to develop NATO’s European pillar. For defence 
minister Jüri Luik, it is important to put EU military 
cooperation projects into practice, which should 
translate into the rise in defence expenditures on 
the part of the European allies1.
Within the CSDP, Estonia has set itself feasible 
goals, which are to attain specific military capa-
bilities, promote its own expertise (cyber defence), 
and to improve military mobility, which is crucial 
for timely reinforcement of the eastern flank. This 
is especially important to a frontier state located 
at a considerable distance from its major allies. 
Tallinn sees EU instruments such as the Europe-
an Defence Fund as a means of developing its 
own fledgling defence industry, which consists of 
small firms that invest in developing a number of 
niche capabilities (cyber defence, robotics, border 
surveillance systems). As there is little scope for 
absorption on the Estonian market, these firms 
seek international projects and EU financing to 
allow them to break into other markets. 
Estonia is involved in three PESCO projects: Mil-
itary Mobility (‘Military Schengen’), Cyber Rapid 
Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber 
Security, and Integrated Unmanned Ground Sys-
tems. In the latter one it is leading the project, 
which also involves Finland, France, Spain, Ger-
many, Belgium, and Latvia. Besides, Tallinn is 
focused  on industrial cooperation. In June 2020, 
the European Commission announced that fur-
ther projects would be financed under two pilot 
programmes before the European Defence Fund 
is introduced in 2021: Preparatory Action on De-
fence Research (PADR), and the European Defence 
Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). Out 
of the applications reviewed for funding under 
the EDIDP for 2019, four Estonian firms and the 
Military Academy, taking part in four projects, 
received over EUR 10 million out of a total of 
500 million available for the period 2019–20202. 
1 V. Veebel, ‘Estonia on the Road to a European Army’ [in:] 
H.-P. Bartels, A.-M. Kellner, U. Optenhögel (eds.), Strategic 
Autonomy and the Defence of Europe: On the Road to a Eu-
ropean Army, Dietz Verlag, May 2017; Idem, ‘Would PESCO 
and a European Army Make Estonians Feel More Secure?’ 
[in:] One Europe – One Army? On the Value of Military Inte-
gration, Zentrum für ethische Bildung in den Streitkräften, 
February 2018, pp. 38–43, www.ethikundmilitaer.de.
2 ‘Estonian projects won more than EUR 10 million from the 
European Defence Fund’, Ministry of Defence of the Republic 
of Estonia, 16 June 2020, www.kaitseministeerium.ee.
Estonia’s new outlook on the CSDP 
follows a shift in US foreign and 
security policy.
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Estonia therefore was the Central and Eastern 
Europe country to benefit the most under the 
programme. In this instance, the main player is 
Milrem Robotics, which has taken the leading role 
in the Integrated Modular Unmanned Ground 
System (iMUGS) project. 
Estonia’s activity within the CSDP is aligned with 
the approach taken by the two other Baltic states 
from 2017 onwards3. All Baltic states wish Euro-
pean military cooperation to be a vital element of 
transatlantic relations, and so to improve those 
relations, and not exacerbate the divisions. Like 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are also taking part in 
three PESCO projects, and would like to see a ‘Mil-
itary Schengen’ established. These two countries 
stress the importance of EU members being able 
to fend off hybrid threats, especially cyberattacks. 
Latvia also realises the potential of military medi-
cine projects. To a certain extent, the interests of 
the Baltic states in EU defence industry support 
programmes are aligned, due to their industries 
being structured in similar ways, and because they 
have similar strategies for modernisation of the 
armed forces (still based on acquiring second-hand 
armaments and military equipment in many cas-
es). Vilnius and Riga are, however, more focused 
on cooperation with the US in terms of military 
investments, leading them to be less interested 
in European defence industrial projects.
Setting a course: France
While increasing its CSDP involvement, Estonia 
has visibly expanded its military cooperation with 
France in recent years. In June 2018, it became 
the first country on NATO’s eastern flank to join 
the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). This 
French-led undertaking is aimed at developing 
a shared strategic culture among the member 
3 M. Šešelgytė, PeSCo: the Lithuanian Perspective, Ares Group, 
September 2018, www.iris-france.org; Idem, Armament and 
Transatlantic Relationships: the Baltic States Perspective, 
Ares Group, November 2019, www.iris-france.org; D. Pala-
venis, ‘Lithuania in European Union common security and 
defence policy context’, Security and Defence Quarterly, 
June 2019, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 15–36; V. Bodnieks, European 
Union Common Security and Defence Policy: implications 
and future perspectives for Latvia, ECPR, September 2019, 
www.ecpr.eu. 
countries and capability to act together in military 
operations within the EU, NATO, the UN and/or ad 
hoc coalitions. From the point of view of defence 
minister Jüri Luik, cooperation in monitoring of 
threats to European security – both from the 
south and the east – and development of a rapid 
crisis response capability are important elements 
of the EI24. 
Tallinn has also been involved in France’s opera-
tions in the Sahel. Roughly 70% of all Estonian 
troops participating in international missions 
are currently in Mali – bolstering the French- 
-led Barkhane and Takuba operations (in total 
95 troops) and the EU Training Mission and the 
UN MINUSMA (20 troops altogether). Estonia 
was France’s first ally to join operation Barkhane 
(September 2018), and remains the only ally that 
has deployed land forces (mechanised infantry 
platoon with armoured personnel carriers)5. It was 
also the first to agree to a request from Paris to 
send special forces (50 troops) to the Sahel in con-
nection with operation Takuba. The deployments 
to Africa put the greatest military and financial 
burden on Estonia since its participation in the 
NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Estonia’s 
armed forces are a mere 6,300 in number, of 
which half are conscripted and do not take part 
in foreign missions. In addition, since 2017, some 
of Estonia’s regular forces have been focusing on 
exercises with the NATO battlegroup at home. 
Estonia stands out among the Baltic states due 
to its close defence cooperation with France. To 
date, Lithuania and Latvia have not joined the EI2 
4 ‘Estonia joins European Intervention Initiative’, Ministry of 
Defence of the Republic of Estonia, 26 June 2018, www.
kaitseministeerium.ee. 
5 As at July 2020. This is not the first time that Estonia has 
been engaged militarily alongside France. It was also in-
volved in EU operations in the Horn of Africa and Chad, and 
UN mission in Lebanon. K. Stoicescu, M. Lebrun, Estonian-
-French Defence Cooperation: Where Estonian Pragmatism 
Meets French Vision, ICDS, August 2019, www.icds.ee; 
K. Stoicescu, Stabilising the Sahel: The Role of International 
Military Operations, ICDS, July 2020, www.icds.ee.
Estonia is the only country on NATO’s 
eastern flank to join the French-led 
European Intervention Initiative.
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and do not play such an active role in the Sahel 
(although over 40 Lithuanian troops are deployed 
to MINUSMA, as a part of the German detach-
ment). Vilnius prioritises cooperation with the 
US, Germany – the NATO battlegroup framework 
nation in Lithuania (where there is also rotation 
of French troops) – and Poland. For Riga, military 
cooperation with the US, and increasingly with 
Canada – the NATO battlegroup framework na-
tion in Latvia – is crucial. President Emmanuel 
Macron’s visit to Lithuania and Latvia at the end 
of September 2020 may move both countries 
closer to France with respect to defence matters 
in the future.
Forging closer military ties between France and 
Estonia may be surprising, because the two coun-
tries are not only divided geographically, but also 
by their perception of threats (the south versus 
the east), their approach to Russia (dialogue versus 
deterrence) or also their approach to the US (EU 
strategic autonomy versus transatlantic mindset). 
Growing uncertainty in Tallinn as to the future of 
the US and UK military posture in Europe provides 
a broader context for the increased importance of 
France in Estonia’s security policy. This relates es-
pecially to the intensifying global rivalry between 
the US and China, which could lead to greater US 
military involvement in South-East Asia. Donald 
Trump’s ‘America First’ is interpreted ambiguously 
in Tallinn. While that presidency has meant greater 
US military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region, 
and greater support for the Baltic states, Estonia 
is concerned about casting doubts on the endur-
ance of the transatlantic relationship, including US 
commitment to collective defence under Article 5, 
and about undermining the role of international 
organisations such as NATO and the EU. The Trump 
administration’s image has suffered additionally 
due to decisions to redirect some financing, in-
cluding funds allocated for a special forces base in 
Estonia, from the European Deterrence Initiative 
(EDI) to build Trump’s Mexico wall (2019), and due 
to decisions to reduce the permanent US military 
presence in Germany by 6,400 (2020)6. Tallinn is 
also worried about the possible negative effects 
of Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
UK’s security policy – such as growing tensions 
between London and the EU member states, or 
cuts in UK defence spending. In addition, Estonia 
is monitoring carefully the UK’s plans to increase 
its military involvement in South-East Asia and 
possible reductions in the land forces and am-
phibious infantry, which is being discussed in 
light of ongoing work on a new strategy for the 
UK’s foreign and security policy. 
Tallinn also considers development of military 
cooperation with Paris to be part of a long-term 
political investment to anchor France – a nuclear 
power, UN Security Council permanent member, 
and continental Europe’s most powerful military – 
more firmly to the eastern flank. From Estonia’s 
perspective, its involvement in the French-led EI2 
serves this purpose among other things. In this 
regard, Tallinn is applying similar logic as in the 
case of joining the UK-led Joint Expeditionary 
Force (JEF). It sees this as a means of demonstrat-
ing a readiness to provide spot reinforcements for 
the major allies in operations outside of Europe, 
counting, in return, on their greater sensitivity to 
the threats in the Baltic Sea region, which would 
enhance deterrence towards Russia. For Tallinn, 
one of the motivations behind assisting France 
in the Sahel is its rotational involvement in the 
UK-led NATO battlegroup in Estonia. This biennial 
contribution consists of a mechanised infantry 
unit of 300 troops (rotating with Denmark and 
Belgium). France also regularly provides fighter 
jets for NATO Baltic Air Policing (BAP).
There is much evidence that expanding military 
cooperation with France comes primarily at the 
initiative of defence minister Jüri Luik, who has 
held that function since 2017. This is because 
there is almost no mention of France in Estoni-
6 S. Sakkov, ‘A view from the frontline: Estonian experience’ 
[in:] Mark Ozawa (ed.), The Alliance Five Years after Crimea: 
Implementing the Wales Summit Pledges, NATO Defense 
College, December 2019, pp. 47–57, www.ndc.nato.int.
Forging closer military ties between 
France and Estonia may be surpris-
ing – the two countries differ in their 
perception of threats and approach 
to the US and Russia.
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an government strategic documents or political 
parties’ manifestos. These in fact place more 
emphasis on the cooperation with the US, the 
UK, or Nordic-Baltic countries. In turn, expert 
community discusses the relationship between 
French rhetoric on European security and its real 
military capabilities. Unlike in the Nordic countries, 
in Estonia there is no debate about the reasons 
for France’s military engagement in Africa and 
resulting gains or losses.
Part of a larger arrangement
Closer military cooperation in the EU and with 
France is a factor complementing a crucial di-
mension for Estonia, which is development of 
transatlantic relations. Even though there is an 
increasing awareness that the post-Cold War order 
is not something that Estonia can take for grant-
ed, and despite enhancing the European pillar of 
the country’s security policy, NATO membership 
and cooperation with the US are still central to 
its strategic culture. 
Tallinn sees NATO collective defence and allied 
military presence in Estonia as the best guarantee 
of an effective deterrent against Russia. From 
Estonia’s perspective, the security of the eastern 
flank has been improved following the 2016 NATO 
Warsaw summit, chiefly due to the deployment 
of the NATO battlegroups to Poland and to the 
Baltic states (eFP). For Tallinn, decisions to in-
crease NATO’s capability for conducting a major 
collective defence operation were also important, 
such as enhancing: the NATO Response Force, the 
combat readiness of the forces of the member 
states (NATO Readiness Initiative), and the NATO 
Command Structure and NATO Force Structure. 
The latter concerns in particular the creation of 
the Headquarters Multinational Division North 
(MND N), in which Estonia is a framework nation, 
in addition to Denmark and Latvia.
Equally, Estonia considers NATO’s involvement in 
the Baltic Sea region to be incomplete, pointing 
out shortcomings in defence of the north-eastern 
flank. One of its proposals is that the allied military 
presence in the region should include maritime 
and air defence components in addition to the 
land forces. In the case of protection of skies, it 
would like to see NATO BAP transformed into 
a Baltic air defence mission, equipped with me-
dium-range surface-based air defence systems in 
addition to fighter jets. Moreover, from Tallinn’s 
viewpoint, NATO needs to regularly exercise de-
ployment of ‘follow-on forces’ to the eastern flank, 
which are designed to reinforce the national forces, 
NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and 
eFP battlegroups. 
From Estonia’s perspective, whose defence de-
pends on a timely NATO response, the divisions 
between the member states, which could im-
pact the alliance’s unity in a crisis, are especially 
worrying. They are exacerbated for example by 
tensions between the US and Western European 
allies regarding the respecting of defence capabil-
ities and military spending pledges, or by Turkey 
blocking an adjustment to the NATO contingency 
plans for Poland and the Baltic states.
In relations with the US, despite the fears de-
scribed above as to Trump administration’s secu-
rity policy, Tallinn is seeking the closest possible 
defence cooperation with the US and to ensure 
that Washington maintains its commitment to 
security of the Baltic states. Estonia has called 
for the greatest possible US military presence in 
Europe on many occasions, the further forward on 
the eastern flank the better. From Tallinn’s point 
of view, the US military footprint is particularly 
important as a deterrent towards Russia. When 
plans were revealed to withdraw some US troops 
from Germany, Estonia suggested that they could 
be hosted on its soil. In Tallinn it has not been 
forgotten that the US was the first ally to deploy 
forces to the Baltic states in response to the an-
nexation of Crimea. Besides, the US reinforced its 
military presence there during the Russian-Bela-
rusian Zapad 2017 exercises. In recent years, the 
US – as a part of the operation Atlantic Resolve – 
For Estonia, expanding the military 
cooperation in the EU and with 
France complements strategic trans-
atlantic relations.
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also organised the largest military exercises in 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (for instance US 
Army Saber Strike and maritime BALTOPS). Finally, 
US Air Force exercises are also valuable for Tallinn, 
as they demonstrate the capability to provide 
quick military assistance to Estonia.
In addition to the US military activity in Estonia 
and the region, the US defence department’s 
aid in modernising Estonia’s armed forces is an 
important aspect of bilateral cooperation. This 
concerns EDI financing for development of Esto-
nia’s military infrastructure (Ämari Air Base and 
Tapa Army Base) and supply of Javelin anti-tank 
missiles, unmanned aircraft systems, large-cali-
bre ammunition, and high-frequency radios. In 
2015–2019, the US military aid for Estonia came 
to USD 260 million (compared with just under 
USD 70 million in the years 1998–2014)7.
There is also no indication that the UK will cease 
being a NATO battlegroup framework nation in 
Estonia in the coming years, as Estonia is the UK’s 
most important foothold on the eastern flank. 
For all of the Baltic states, participation in the 
UK-led JEF demonstrates a long-term strategy for 
expanding military cooperation with the UK. The 
JEF exercises conducted in 2019 (Baltic Protector), 
which included Royal Marines amphibious landing 
in Estonia, indicate that this expeditionary force 
will also be operationally involved in the Baltic 
Sea region.
7 ‘USA Military Aid to Estonia’, Ministry of Defence of the 
Republic of Estonia, www.riigikaitseareng.ee.
With regard to security policy, Estonian polit-
ical parties are essentially pro-Atlantic. This is 
also the dominant trend in public debate and 
in the media, although public opinion is more 
diverse in this respect, due to the division into 
Estonian- and Russian-speakers (about 30% of 
the population). This polarisation is apparent for 
instance in the case of attitudes to NATO, which 
is trusted by 77% of the Estonian-speaking com-
munity, and only 35% of the Russian-speakers 
(research conducted in 20198). Support for NATO 
membership is 90% among Estonian-speakers 
and 44% among Russian-speakers, and for the 
presence of NATO forces in Estonia – 91% and 
37% respectively. Only 27% of Russian-speaking 
respondents agreed that the NATO battlegroup 
contributes to the country’s security, while this 
figure was 77% among Estonian-speakers. The 
two groups also differ in their attitudes towards 
the US, which is considered a threat to peace 
and security by 28% of Estonian-speakers and by 
41% of Russian-speakers. In contrast, the attitude 
towards closer military cooperation within the EU 
stands out in these opinion polls. There is broad 
public support for such cooperation (73% of re-
spondents), and the existing gap between Esto-
nian- and Russian-speakers is smaller (78% and 
61% in favour respectively). This is not only an 
incentive for Estonia to play an active part in the 
CSDP, but also an opportunity to increase the level 
of public approval for the country’s security policy, 
beyond ethnic and language divides.
8 Public Opinion and National Defence, Ministry of De-
fence of the Republic of Estonia, March 2019, www.
kaitseministeerium.ee.
